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SUBCHAPTER S: DEBT RECLASSIFICATION
AND THE
ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQUIREMENT
by Paul D. Smith
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code' provides a number of benefits
to the corporation which is financed primarily through shareholder owned
debt, rather than equity. In order to take advantage of these provisions, incor-
porators, particularly those of small, closely held corporations, often finance
the corporation by providing the necessary risk capital through debt. As a
result of this practice, the courts have developed the "debt reclassification
doctrine," under which a shareholder loan which does not in fact constitute
bona fide debt can be reclassified for tax purposes as equity.!
When Congress enacted subchapter S,' allowing qualifying corporations to
elect an alternate mode of taxation, it seemed to many that it removed the
incentive for such tax avoidance schemes.4 The act was heralded as "the cure-
all of 'thin incorporation' difficulties."' However, the continued strict applica-
tion of the doctrine of debt reclassification has changed what Congress in-
tended as a simple provision benefiting the small corporation, into "another
maze added to the already complicated jungle of provisions" that make up the
Internal Revenue Code.6 Assuming that purported corporate debt is to be
reclassified as equity, must it necessarily follow that such equity constitutes a
second class of stock,' thus making the corporation ineligible for election under
subchapter S?
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §5 301-95.
'Although the name "thin capitalization doctrine" or "thin incorporation doctrine" is
more commonly used, the designation "debt reclassification" is preferred since the ratio of
debt to equity is only one of the considerations in determining whether purported loans are
actually at the risk of the business, and, as such, to be considered equity. See Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957). For a more extensive discussion of the
cases establishing the doctrine of debt reclassification, see M. LORE, THIN CAPITALIZATION
33 (1958); Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 31
(1959). See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 385.
' For an excellent discussion of the history and development of the concepts underlying
subchapter S, see Bravenec, The One Class of Stock Requirement of Subchapter S-A Round
Peg in a Pentagonal Hole, 6 HOUSTON L. REV. 215, 238 (1968).
4According to one of its proponents, Senator Sparkman of Alabama, the purposes of
subchapter S were to grant tax relief to small businesses and, as a companion to subchapter
R which permitted some partnerships to elect to be taxed as corporations, to eliminate the
influence of the federal income tax on the selection of the form under which a business asso-
ciation would be organized. 104 CONG. REC. 5014-15 (1958). Subchapter R was subse-
quently repealed (effective January 1, 1969) by the Act of Apr. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-389, § 4, 80 Stat. 111. For a discussion of the kinds of businesses which would gen-
erally find election under subchapter S advantageous, see Hrusoff, Election, Operation and
Termination of a Subchapter S Corporation, 11 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1965).
' Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporations, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 190 (1959).
aI. SCHREIBER, SUBCHAPTER S: ITS OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS 126 (1965). In
spite of the problems, however, extensive use has been made of the subchapter S election.
After the first 5 years of its existence, subchapter S had been utilized by 1 out of every
10 corporations. IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1963, CORPORATE INCOME TAX RETURNS
141 (1968).
7See text accompanying note 10 infra.
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I. USE OF DEBT FINANCING IN THE SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATE
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
A. The Subchapter S Corporation
Under the provisions of subchapter S, a "small business corporation"8
may elect to be exempt from income taxation at the corporate level. Instead,
income and losses are passed through to the shareholders, who report their pro
rata shares on their individual income tax returns
To qualify for the subchapter S election, the corporation must meet five
criteria: it must be a domestic corporation which is not a member of an
affiliated group, not having more than ten shareholders, all of whom must be
individuals or estates and none of whom may be non-resident aliens, and not
having more than one class of stock.'" Moreover, the election may be filed
only with the unanimous consent of the shareholders," and continues in effect
until terminated."2 Termination may be by any of a number of means," either
voluntarily by the shareholders, 4 or involuntarily, if the corporation at any
time ceases to fulfill any of the criteria for eligibility."5 A common cause of
such involuntary termination is failure to meet the one class of stock require-
ment.
Taxation of the Subchapter S Corporation. An understanding of the unique
principles of taxation under subchapter S is an essential prerequisite for a
detailed analysis of the one class of stock requirement. Basically, the operating
gains and losses" of an electing corporation are passed through the corpora-
tion to the shareholders on a pro rata basis according to their stock holdings,"'
much as in a partnership.8 The shareholder must include in his gross income
8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 1371(a). Although the Code uses the language "small






"Id. 5 1372(e) (2).
4 Id. When a new shareholder enters the corporation, he must consent to the election
within 30 days, or it is automatically terminated. Id. § 1372(e) (1); Treas. Reg. S
1.1372-3(b) (1969).
5INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1372(e) (3). Of particular importance is the provision
that if the corporation ceases to be eligible for election, the termination is automatically
retroactive to the first day of the taxable year in which the ineligibility arose. This can bring
about rather harsh consequences in a situation where no tax has been paid at the corporate
level for a number of years in reliance on the election, only to have the Commissioner sub-
sequently challenge its eligibility retroactively, assessing a substantial deficiency. Such a
financial blow would be especially severe to a small business, the very type to which sub-
chapter S was meant to be applicable.
16Id. § 1373(d). Operating gains and losses and taxable income are computed for the
subchapter S corporation in the same manner as in the conventional corporation, except for
the losses allowed under S 172 and the deductions provided for in §5 241-47. These are not
available to a subchapter S corporation.
17 1d. § 1373(b), 137 4 (c). The taxable income is ordinary income in the bands of
the shareholder, regardless of its character in the hands of the corporation, with one ex-
ception. The excess of the corporation's net long-term capital gain over its net short-term
capital loss is treated as capital gain in the hands of the shareholder, subject to certain
restrictions. Id. § 1375. See notes 36-41 infra, and accompanying text.
28 There are, however, significant distinctions between the taxation of a subchapter S
corporation and partnerships. These are beyond the scope of this Comment. See B. BITTKER
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not only the dividends actually distributed during the taxable year, but also
his pro rata share of the corporation's undistributed taxable income (UTI)
which would have been dividend income to him had the corporation dis-
tributed all of its earnings and profits on the last day of the taxable year."9
UTI already taxed to the shareholder, but not yet distributed, is then placed
in a capital account as previously taxed income (PTI), and the basis of the
shareholder's stock is increased by a corresponding amount.0 Since the funds
held in the PTI account have already been taxed to the shareholder, they can
be withdrawn without payment of further taxes. Just as his basis in his stock
was increased at the time the account was credited, any subsequent PTI dis-
tribution will reduce the shareholder's basis. To the extent that the distribution




Leaving substantial amounts in the PTI account exposes them to significant
dangers. PTI is reduced by the amount of the corporation's net operating loss
which is allowable as a deduction to the shareholder.2 ' Therefore, any PTI
balances not distributed prior to the incurring of corporate losses will not be
available for future tax free withdrawal. Tax free distribution is also lost if
the subchapter S election is terminated for any reason, even if the corporation
subsequently re-elects.' PTI is personal to the shareholder who has reported it
on his return. Thus, a transferee of stock acquires no right to the PTI of his
transferor.' In the event of the death of the shareholder, any PTI to which he
would have been entitled is not available to his estate, heirs, or beneficiaries.'
These dangers of losing PTI left in the corporation clearly constitute an
incentive to keep the PTI account at the lowest possible level. However, other
provisions, such as the requirement that PTI be taken out only in the form of
money, often make this difficult to accomplish.
The practical operation of subchapter S can best be illustrated by example.
Assume that X corporation, a corporation electing under subchapter S, has
current earnings and profits and taxable income of $100,000 in 1970. During
the year, it distributes $50,000 to A, its sole shareholder. The remaining
$50,000 is UTI for 1970, and is taxed to A as a dividend, since earnings and
& J. EUSTICH, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 711
(2d ed. 1966); Bersch, A Roadmap of Subchapter S, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 99 (1961);
Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program, 46 VA. L. REV.
61 (1960); Note, Optional Taxation of Closely Held Corporations Under the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958, 72 HARV. L. REV. 710 (1959).
'
91INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1373(b).
2 Id. § 1376(a).
"
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4 (a) (1968). See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
301(c) (3) (A).
1
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1375(d) (2) (B) (i).
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1968).
'Id. § 1375-4(e). However, if the shareholder retains any stock whatsoever, he is en-
titled to the full amount of the PTI. Further, if a shareholder transfers all his stock, and
subsequently reacquires any part of it while the same election is still in effect, he is entitled
to all of his previous PTI balance.
"2Id. § 1.1375-4(e). See also Caplin, supra note 5, at 191. Moreover, additional prob-
lems arise when the ownership of the stock is divided between a life tenant and a remain-
derman, and when the stock is held as separate property in a community property state.
See Bravenec, supra note 3, at 221 n.49.
26 See note 44 infra, and accompanying text.
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profits are adequate to cover it. This $50,000 is then credited to A's PTI ac-
count, and the basis of his stock is increased.
If current earnings and profits exceed taxable income,' the result will be
different. If X corporation has current earnings and profits of $100,000, but
taxable income of only $40,000, the $50,000 cash distribution is still a divi-
dend, since earnings and profits are sufficient to cover it. Since there is no
undistributed taxable income remaining in the corporation, there will be no
UTI tax to A.28 The difference of $50,000, although not taxed in the year
realized, becomes part of accumulated earnings and profits. It will thus ulti-
mately be taxed as a dividend when distributed to A.'
One of the principal benefits of subchapter S is the treatment it allows for
losses and gains, and the unique tax consequences which result. Ordinary
losses incurred by an electing corporation are allocated among the shareholders
by determining the corporation's daily loss' and allocating that loss on a pro
rata basis to the stock outstanding on each day. 1 Thus, the allocation of losses
is essentially the same as in partnerships, although the allocation of income
basically follows the corporate rules.
One of the primary advantages of a subchapter S corporation is that, unlike
a partnership or sole proprietorship, its shareholders are afforded protection
from personal liability, and, at the same time, can deduct from their individual
income the ordinary losses incurred by the business. The amount of the pro
rata share of the net operating loss of a subchapter S corporation which a
shareholder can deduct from his income is limited to the adjusted basis of his
net investment, stock and debt, in the corporation.2 As the shareholder de-
ducts these losses, his basis in the stock and debt is reduced by a corresponding
amount. 3 When the shareholder's share of the losses exceeds his basis in his
investment in the corporation, any excess losses are, for deduction purposes,
unavailable for future use."4 They can neither be carried forward by the share-
holder nor deducted by the corporation itself. Herein lies a major distinction
from the taxation of a partnership.' Once the losses deducted by a shareholder
27 This situation could occur, for example, where percentage depletion is used to deter-
mine taxable income, but cost depletion is used to determine earnings and profits, or where
the corporation earns tax free income, as from municipal bonds. See Treas. Reg.
1.312-6(c)(1) (1955).2 See id. § 1.1373-1(g) (Example 2) (1968).
2 Only after all current earnings and profits have been distributed do distributions come
from the PTI account. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1375(d); Treas. Reg. S 1.1375-4(b)
(1968).
" The daily loss is computed by dividing the total loss at the end of the taxable year
by the number of days in the year. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 1374(c) (1).
31 Id. The Code makes specific provision for the situation where a shareholder holds
for only a part of the taxable year, not including the last day. The corporation's daily loss
is allocated to the shareholder on a pro rata basis, but in no event to exceed his basis in
the corporation.
2INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1374; Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-1(b) (4) (1968).
32 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 1376(b). There accrues from this procedure an obvious
tax advantage. The loss, when taken on the shareholder's individual return, is treated as
an ordinary loss. Since it correspondingly reduces the shareholder's basis in his stock, it is
recaptured as a capital gain upon disposition of the stock. In other words, the shareholder
is allowed to exchange an ordinary loss for a capital gain.
M Id. S 1374(c) (2). See also Richard L. Plowden, 48 T.C. 666 (1967).
s INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704(d). This section provides, in part, that any unused
loss can be carried forward by a partner until such time as his basis is increased sufficiently
to offset the loss.
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of a subchapter S corporation exceed his basis in the corporation, however, the
basis can be increased again only by additional investment in the business,
either in the form of equity or debt, or subsequent accumulations of PTI.
In an ordinary corporation, dividends paid out of current earnings and
profits are taxed to the shareholders as ordinary income. The corporation's
income does not retain the characteristics of the transactions which created it
when distributed as dividends. In the case of a corporation electing under sub-
chapter S, one exception is made. The partnership conduit principle is applied
to long-term capital gains. The shareholder may treat as long-term capital gain
that portion of any amount includable in his gross income as a corporate
dividend, to the extent that it is paid out of current earnings and profits, which
represents his pro rata share of the corporation's excess of net long-term capital
gain over net short-term capital loss during the taxable year."
Net long-term capital gain of the corporation is reduced by ordinary deduc-
tions as well as by current and carried over capital losses in computing taxable
income."* The amount of the net long-term capital gain over the net short-
term capital loss can, therefore, be in excess of taxable income. The electing
corporation could take advantage of this to pass through a portion of accumu-
lated earnings and profits at capital gains rates where the excess of net long-
term capital gains over net short-term capital loss is, in fact, greater than cur-
rent earnings and profits. To prevent this, Congress restricted the amount
allocable as capital gains to the amount of the taxable income of the corpora-
tion for the taxable year."
The Code also provides for a further restriction on the amount of capital
gains which can be passed through to the shareholder without being taxed at
the corporate level."o Under this provision, most corporations0 are taxed if the
excess of the net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss exceeds
$25,000 and fifty percent of the corporation's taxable income for the year.41
The amount of the tax is the lesser of the section 1201 tax on the excess over
the $25,000 ceiling or the section 11 tax on the entire taxable income of the
corporation.
Unlike partnerships, the capital losses of a subchapter S corporation are not
passed through directly to the shareholders. The only benefit the shareholders
derive is if the corporation has capital gains, because the capital gains are
reduced by capital losses and the net capital gain does pass through to the
shareholders." As with conventional corporations, the subchapter S corpora-
" Id. § 1375 (a).
" In this computation, the electing corporation must net the gains and losses from the
sale of real or depreciable property used in the trade or business and cannot pass through
the ordinary deduction and capital gains separately. Such net long-term capital gain of the
corporation, however, will not be set off against a net loss from the sale of real or depre-
ciable property realized by the shareholder.8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1375(a) (1).
391d. § 1378.
40The Code specifically excepts certain corporations from the tax imposed by § 1378.
Excepted are electing corporations whose election has been in effect for at least 3 years and
those which are not more than 4 years old and have had an election in effect for each of
the years of its existence.41 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1378(a).
aId. § 1375(a) (1).
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tion is entitled to carry forward an unused capital loss for five years.3 Thus,
the only way the corporation's shareholders will derive any benefit from some
or all of the capital losses is if the corporation has capital gains within the
six-year span of the current and the next five succeeding years. If no capital
gains occur, the capital losses will never be useable.
Distributions of property by a subchapter S corporation can be from previ-
ously taxed income, and as such tax free to the shareholders, but only if the
distribution is in money. Distributions of property other than money are not
treated as coming from PTI. The purpose of this rule is to prevent the dis-
tribution of appreciated property tax-free to the shareholder whose basis would
then be equal to the fair market value of the property. Thus, were it not for
the rule, no tax would ever be paid on the appreciated value. For example,
assume that A, shareholder in X corporation, an electing subchapter S cor-
poration, has a PTI balance of $10,000. X owns property in which it has a
basis of $10,000, but which has appreciated to a fair market value of $15,000.
If X could distribute the property to A as a tax free distribution of PTI, A's
basis in the property, according to conventional corporate concepts, would be
the fair market value at the time of the distribution, or $15,000. The $5,000
of appreciated value would completely avoid taxation. Thus, any distribution
of property other than money is treated as a dividend.'
In practice, this rule could cause a situation where a subchapter S corpora-
tion could not make a distribution of PTI. If the corporation has insufficient
cash to make a distribution in money, it can make the distribution only by
selling an asset. But, if that sale generated income, as would presumably be
the case in the type of situation to which the rule is directed, then the dis-
tribution of the proceeds would be at least in part from current earnings and
profits, and not from the PTI account. The dangers of leaving a balance in
PT146 are, thus, in some cases, difficult to avoid, and must be planned for
carefully.
The One Class of Stock Requirement. The requirement that an electing cor-
poration have only one class of stock outstanding 7 has been one of the major
sources of confusion, controversy, and litigation to arise under the provisions
of subchapter S. The greatest problem has centered around the question of
how stringently the requirement is to be applied in disqualifying a corporation
'Id. § 1 2 12(a) (1) (B). The 3-year carryback, however, is not allowed to a subchapter
S corporation. Id. § 1212(a) (3).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1968). See also INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 1375(f);
C.D. Fountain, 59 T.C. No. 69 (Feb. 22, 1973); Randall N. Clark, 58 T.C. 2533 (1972).
'Although the validity of the applicable regulation, id., has been attacked, DeTreville
v. United States, 445 F.2d 1306 (4th Cit. 1971), it is unlikely that it will or should be
changed absent legislation that will deal with the problem of the avoidance of tax on appre-
ciation. One solution to the problem would be to adopt the partnership form for purposes
of an electing corporation. If all earnings and profits of the subchapter S corporation were
treated as they are in partnerships, the basis of the corporate stock being increased by earn-
ings and decreased by distributions, distributions of property could be made against basis,
and the corporation's basis for the property could carry over to the shareholder who would
individually realize the gain on any appreciation when he sold the property. See INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 732.
40 See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.47 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a) (4).
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which otherwise would be eligible for the election. Although the purpose of
Congress in imposing the restriction is not clear, there is no reason to believe
that it was designed to restrict the size of a qualifying corporation. In fact, it
is not at all unusual for a small, closely-held corporation to have a second
class of stock to provide for such problems as differing family interests and
corporate control. " Nor is there any indication that Congress had in mind the
prevention of tax avoidance through the manipulation of two classes of stock.49
The question is further obscured by the absence of congressional committee
reports in 1958, the year subchapter S was enacted, discussing the one class of
stock requirement. A provision very similar to subchapter S was considered in
1954, which contained the requirement that a corporation have only one class
of stock. The pertinent Senate committee reports of that year indicate that the
purpose of the requirement was twofold: to accomplish administrative ease by
preventing the complexities which would result from having to allocate earn-
ings among several classes of stock, and to avoid the administrative problems
created by payment of dividends on preferred stock in excess of the current
year's earnings.,9
If administrative ease is the basis for the one class of stock requirement,
rather than equity or economic policy, there is no justification for expanding
the requirement beyond the area of allocation of income. Therefore, for pur-
poses of eligibility for election under subchapter S, differing rights not affecting
the allocation of the corporation's earnings should not be deemed as giving
rise to a second class of stock." In the case of a class of preferred stock, there
would be no administrative problem in allocating the subchapter S corpora-
tion's earnings in the event that such earnings were sufficient to cover the
preferred dividends for the year. Whether or not the dividends were paid, the
preferred stockholder could be taxed on the amount of the dividend he would
have received, and the excess earnings taxed to the common shareholders.
Those preferred dividends taxed, but not yet distributed, would then be avail-
able for future tax-free distribution to the preferred shareholders.
The Senate committee report expressed concern over the problem of a
dividend paid to preferred shareholders in excess of current earnings and
profits, since the excess would have to come out of the common shareholders'
PTI accounts." For example, if X, an electing subchapter S corporation, had
earnings of $50,000 in 1970 and paid a required dividend of $25,000 to its
preferred shareholders, the balance of $25,000 is taxable to the common
shareholders as UTI. Assuming that no distribution is made to the common
48 See text accompanying notes 97-98 infra.
49 One such avoidance problem could arise from a family situation in which the father
owned all the common stock and actively conducted the business, while the children owned
the preferred stock and shared in the earnings, thus transferring the income into lower
brackets. The Code adequately provides for this by authorizing the Commissioner to reallo-
cate the income among the family members so as to reflect the value of services actually
rendered to the corporation. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1375 (c).
5°S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119, 453-54 (1954). See also Shores Realty
Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972). This conclusion is given further sup-
port by the Committee Reports of 1964, when certain provisions of subchapter S were
amended. See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1964).
5" Unfortunately, the Service has not taken this position. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 63-226,
1963-2 CUM. BULL. 341.
"See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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shareholders in 1970, their PTI accounts are credited by an aggregate of
$25,000. If in 1971 (or any year thereafter) the corporation has no earnings
and profits, the $25,000 retained in 1970 would be distributed as dividends
to the preferred shareholders, but there would be no tax due, the tax already
having been paid by the common shareholders in 1970. The result is that the
common shareholders have paid the income tax on $25,000 which was in
reality income to the preferred shareholders.
Although this situation seems to offer a convincing argument in favor of
the one class of stock requirement, the common shareholders would not
necessarily be without protection under the existing Code provisions. The
shareholders could cause all income to be distributed to the shareholders in
the year earned." In addition, Congress could provide a remedy by allowing
the common shareholders a loss of $25,000 in 1971. In the event that the
preferred stock was noncumulative, there would, of course, be no problem. If
a dividend were not paid for a year, there would be no transfer of PTI from
the common to the preferred shareholders. Thus, it appears that for most pur-
poses subchapter S rules could be revised to allow for more than one class of
stock without unduly complicating their administration for tax purposes.
B. Corporate Debt Financing: The Debt Reclassification Doctrine
There exist a number of motivations in the tax laws for corporations to use
debt rather than equity financing in the corporate capital structure. The chief
advantage to the corporation lies in the fact that interest payments made to a
creditor-shareholder for loans made by him to the corporation are deductible,
whereas dividends paid on his stock are not. 4 Moreover, issuance of debt
securities rather than stock can protect against imposition of the accumulated
earnings tax." The accumulation of earnings within the corporation to provide
for repayment of outstanding debt is considered a reasonable business pur-
pose, " and as such is not subject to the tax.7 Finally, the exchange of cor-
porate debt securities for depreciable property transferred by shareholders to
a controlled corporation may also result in tax benefits. Since it is likely that
short-term debt instruments would not be classified as securities within the
meaning of section 351,8 the corporation may be able to avoid the nonrecog-
nition provisions of that section, and, in so doing, acquire an increase in its
basis of the property by transferring such obligations in exchange for the
property.
'3 Such an alternative is even more advisable in view of the tax disadvantages in leaving
PTI in the corporation. See notes 22-25 supra, and accompanying text. Total distribution of
earnings and profits could, however, seriously impede the corporation's growth.
54 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 16 3(a). Payments made as interest are considered to be
ordinary and necessary business expenses, while dividends are normally distributions of
profits.55 See id. § 531.
"Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), af'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954). Where,
however, the debt is not bona fide, but utilized as part of a scheme to avoid the accumulated
earnings tax, such accumulations will no longer be treated as part of the reasonable needs
of the business.
"' Id. at 703; see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533.58 1d. 5 351. This section provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on the transfer
of property to a corporation by one in control of the corporation. It is thus potentially ap-
plicable to most corporations of the type most likely to elect under subchapter S.
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There are also certain advantages to the shareholder in contributing the
necessary risk capital to the corporation in the form of loans, rather than
equity. Through the use of debt financing, the shareholder can accomplish a
tax free withdrawal of funds from the corporation. Repayment of a debt
generally is considered as a return of capital, and thus a nontaxable event, 9
whereas a stock redemption is taxable to the shareholder, either as capital gain
or ordinary income."' Further tax benefits to the shareholder arise if the cor-
poration fails, for he may be able to take an ordinary bad debt deduction for
debt capital, " whereas this would generally not be the case for equity capital.
Finally, the use of debt financing can also provide benefits in a possible future
merger or refinancing of the corporation."'
The potential tax savings made possible through these benefits have given
rise to a number of "thin corporations"-those corporations whose financial
structure is composed predominantly of debt, rather than equity. In order to
avoid certain taxes," the shareholders fund the corporation with a minimum of
equity capital, and a much greater amount of debt capital. The courts re-
sponded to this method of tax avoidance by developing the debt reclassifica-
tion doctrine, under which the debt capital is, for tax purposes, reclassified as
equity capital."4 A number of factors are generally considered in determining
whether or not to reclassify. The prime factor in early cases was the overall
debt/equity ratio of the corporation involved." Later decisions began to con-
sider additional factors, such as whether the debt instruments were held pro
5' Even if the amount received is more than the debtholder's basis in the debt, the excess
is taxed only as a capital gain under the provisions of § 1232(a) (2) (A). If the debt is
retired at less than its face amount, however, the corporation will realize ordinary income.
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949); INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a) (12).
However, recognition of that gain can be postponed by an election by the corporation to
reduce its basis in one of its assets under §§ 108(a) and 1017.
60See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 55 301(c), 302(c) (2), 302(d).
61 Id. § 166. Most shareholders will be limited to the short-term capital loss allowed for
nonbusiness bad debts.
62 If, in such a reorganization, the principal amount of debt securities received does not
exceed the principal amount of debt securities surrendered, taxable gain will not arise. See
id. § 354(a); Caplin, supra note 2, at 32; Silverman, Debt in Corporate Amalgamations,
44 VA. L. REV. 873, 883 (1958).
61 The most common schemes are those designed to prevent the so-called "double tax"
imposed on corporate income. See Dunn, Thin Incorporation: The Debt-Equity Issue,
N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 309 (1970). The corporation's income is taxed once
as income to the corporation, and, if distributed as dividends to the shareholders, it is taxed
a second time as income to them.
"Among the cases dealing with the deductibility to the corporation of interest paid by
it are Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1965); Montclair,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38 (5th Cit. 1963); Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956). The effect of the distribution of funds from the cor-
poration in repayment of principal was dealt with in Moughon v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d
399 (6th Cit. 1964); P.M. Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1962).
The treatment of the loss on the debt was considered in Arlington Park Jockey Club, Inc.
v. Sauber, 262 F.2d 902 (7th Cit. 1959); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1959).
"
5See Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1951); Note, Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1054,
1061 (1955), and cases cited therein. There have been attempts to determine what corporate
debt/equity ratio would be safe from the threat of reclassification. Based on certain early
cases, such as John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), and Talbot Mills
v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cit. 1944), a/I'd sub nom. John Kelley Co. v. Com-
missioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), it appears to some that 4:1 marks the boundary. See
Caplin, supra note 2; N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 771, 783-84 (1959).
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rata by the shareholders,"6 whether the funds represented by the debt were
used to purchase assets essential to the formation of the business,"' and such
subjective factors as whether the holder of the debt intended to treat the debt
as would an outside creditor. "
The general trend seems to be that when the capital structure of the cor-
poration is such that an outside creditor would not advance funds to it,"' the
fact that a shareholder did make such an advance raises the presumption that
his intent was not to create a creditor-debtor relationship,"0 but rather that
his sole motive was tax avoidance.71 When necessary to prevent this attempted
avoidance of the corporate tax imposed by subchapter C, the courts will
reclassify the debt capital as equity, thus depriving the corporation of the
advantages sought in the impermissible debt financing.
C. The Uses of Debt Financing in the Subchapter S Corporation
The unique principles of corporate taxation under subchapter S, allowing
" 1432 Broadway Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), afl'd per curiam, 160
F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947). In Leach Corp., 30 T.C. 563 (1958), the court emphasized the
fact that the debt and equity were not held pro rata, stating in dicta that only in the case
of pro rata holding is there a maximum incentive to issue debt. However, even if the holding
is not pro rata, a court may reclassify the debt as equity. Reed v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d
334 (2d Cir. 1957).
67Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 43 (1949), afl'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 70 (9th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951).
" Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d
159 (6th Cir. 1956).
9 The normal debt/equity ratios for close corporations cannot be determined because
of the inherent nature of such a closely held corporation and the fact that there is little
financial data available as to their capital structures. Generally, normal credit standards will
call for different capital structures within different industries. The more speculative the
industry or business, the less likely is a bona fide creditor, with an expectation of repayment
regardless of the success of the business, to advance funds to a corporation with a high
debt/equity ratio. The court is thus less likely to sustain the capital advance as a bona fide
indebtedness. For example, where the stockholders paid in $15,000 to a corporation or-
ganized to drill for oil, of which $14,000 was allocated to debt, the court refused to recog-
nize the debt as such, but considered it to be equity. Michael Cohen, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
236 (1944), aff'd, 148 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1945). If such a highly speculative venture
proved unsuccessful, the creditors' interests would probably be wiped out as quickly as
those of the stockholders. Hence, the risk involved in a particular business venture should
be a factor leading to a reclassification of debt as stock. See Brinker v. United States, 116
F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1953). As a general rule, the more stable the industry as a whole,
and the particular business involved, the higher will be the financial ratio acceptable to the
courts. G. PATON, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 78 (1967). Most of the decisions, how-
ever, where the thin capitalization test has been applied to reclassify purported debt have
involved ratios which would be abnormally high in any industry. See, e.g., Robert L. Os-
borne, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 428 (1954); Hilbert L. Bair, 16 T.C. 90 (1951), aff'd, 199
F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1952); Swoby Corp., 9 T.C. 887 (1947). The conclusion seems to be
that if a disinterested lender would not have made the advances, there will likely be at
least a potential reclassification problem. See Brinker v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 294
(N.D. Cal. 1953); Samuel T. Tauber, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 269 (1952); Erard A.
Matthiessen, 16 T.C. 781 (1951).
7"Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956); R.E.
Nelson, 19 T.C. 575 (1952); Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192
F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951); cf. Erard A. Matthiessen, 16 T.C. 781 (1951), afl'd per curiam,
194 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1952).
7 The mere presence of a tax motive is not, in itself, sufficient basis for reclassification.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848
(2d Cir. 1947). However, the courts have held that if there is no other purpose for the
transaction, such is evidentiary of the fact that the alleged debtor-creditor relationship is a
sham. Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954); H.E. Fletcher Co., 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1025 (1951); cf. The Humko Co., 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1121 (1943); Benton v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952). But see Sun Properties v. United States, 220 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1955).
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the pass-through of earnings and losses to the shareholders, remove many of
the advantages of internal debt financing. The exemption from the double
tax"' imposed on corporate income by subchapter C has prompted some to
the view that there is, in a subchapter S corporation, no advantage, tax or
non-tax, in substituting debt capital for equity capital."' To a certain extent,
this is true. For example, assume that A owns sixty percent of a subchapter
S corporation and B owns forty percent, each having loaned the sums of
$6,000 and $4,000, respectively. If they are to be paid $300 and $200 on
the advances yearly, it will make no difference whether such payments are
denominated interest or dividends. Assume that in 1970 the corporation
earns $1,000 before making the payments to A and B. If the payments are
considered interest, the corporation will have $500 income after making them,
and A and B will have interest income of $300 and $200, respectively. More-
over, A will be taxed on an additional $300 and B on an additional $200
of UTI, whether actually paid to them or not."4 If the corporation has no
earnings in 1971, or in any year thereafter, but makes the payments to A
and B, they would again be subject to tax on the interest income, but there
would also be a net loss to the corporation of $500, which would be passed
through to the shareholders proportionally." The same net results would
ensue if the payments were made in the form of dividends, rather than in-
terest. In 1970 the shareholders would be taxed on $500 of dividend income
and $500 of UTI; in 1971 the payments would be made out of their respec-
tive PTI accounts, and as such would not be taxable."0
In spite of the foregoing, there still remain a number of reasons, non-tax
as well as tax, why a subchapter S corporation might desire to use debt
financing to a certain degree."
Use of Debt for Income Splitting. If the subchapter S corporation is wholly
owned by members of one family, debt financing has been used to distribute
most of the corporate income to those family members who are in lower income
tax brackets, who receive shares. The bulk of the capitalization would be
obtained by having the members of the family in high income tax brackets
contribute in the form of loans, in return for notes bearing little or no in-
terest." UTI would thus be taxable only to the shareholders. Such a plan
72 See note 63 supra, and accompanying text.
"1 See, e.g., Manly, Election Under Subchapter S Can Eliminate Thin-Incorporation Prob-
lems, 9 J. TAXATION 322, 323 (1958).
7'See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
,5See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
76 See text accompanying notes 24-25 sapra.
"1 It should be emphasized that some of the uses of debt to be discussed are legitimate
whereas others have been adjudged impermissible. For example, the use of debt capital to
achieve intrafamily income splitting has long been recognized as an illegitimate form of
tax avoidance. See, e.g., Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930). See also S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 939-40
(1960). Certain business and estate planning goals, on the other hand, are entirely proper.
The permissibility of use of debt capital to protect PTI, preserve the loss deduction, remove
earnings and profits, and make distributions in kind is as yet undetermined.
7 Another similar technique is to have the shareholder-creditor make loans, evidenced
by notes paying as interest a stated percentage of the net profits of the corporation. This
obvious attempt to approximate a class of preferred stock has been challenged by the Coin-
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would be feasible only if there is an expectation that the corporation will
have earnings which the shareholders do not intend to withdraw. Otherwise,
if losses are anticipated, as is often the case for fledgling corporations, the
family members in the higher income tax brackets would want to receive as
great a proportion of the losses as possible, and would, therefore, subscribe
to the stock themselves.
Protecting the PTI. Because of the dangers inherent in leaving balances in
the shareholders' PTI accounts,"9 it is generally desirable to withdraw from
these accounts as quickly as possible. There is a problem, however, when the
corporation needs to retain all or part of its earnings for the stability or
expansion of the business. The best solution from a protection standpoint is
to distribute all earnings before the close of each year, and have the share-
holders immediately loan them back to the corporation. Such an arrangement
meets the economic needs of the business, protects against the dangers of
loss of PTI, and still allows tax free withdrawal of income which has already
been taxed.
Preserving the Shareholders' Loss Deduction. Once a shareholder has deducted
as corporate net operating losses an amount equal to his total investment in
the corporation, he may take no further loss deductions until such time as
his basis is increased."° If the shareholder desires to continue the business after
his basis has been exhausted, he must make additional loans or equity contri-
butions in order to be able to continue to deduct further operating losses.
Removal of Earnings and Profits in Excess of Taxable Income. Difficulties
may confront a subchapter S corporation which has current earnings and
profits in excess of its taxable income."' Such could be the case when it
receives tax exempt income or utilizes percentage depletion." As a result of
this disparity, actual distributions could bring about dividends greater than
the corporation's taxable income. By the use of debt, however, the excess
may be taken out tax free. Assume that A is the sole shareholder of a sub-
chapter S corporation. In 1970 the corporation has $100,000 of taxable in-
come and $25,000 of tax exempt income. If no distributions are made, A
will be taxed on $100,000, and his PTI account will be increased by a like
amount. If $125,000 is subsequently distributed, A will be taxed on $25,000.
If, however, A held a debt instrument for $25,000, the corporation could
distribute $25,000 in repayment of the debt. Such a payment would be a
return of capital to A and, as such, nontaxable.' The same analysis would
missioner on at least one occasion. See Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 5 9261 (7th Cir. 1973).
"See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
81 See generally Albrecht, "Dividends" and "Earnings or Profits," 7 TAx L. REV. 157
(1952); Andrews, "Out of Its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on the Taxation of
Dividends, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1403 (1956); Schwanbeck, The Accountant's Problem in
Working with "Earnings and Profits" for Tax Purposes, 10 J. TAXATION 22 (1959).
2 Percentage depletion reduces taxable income, while earnings and profits are reduced
only by cost depletion. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 611-17.831d. S 1232.
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apply if the corporation had accumulated earnings and profits from a prior
year."4 Assume the preceding hypothetical situation was altered so that the
corporation had accumulated $25,000 of earnings and profits prior to making
an election under subchapter S in 1970. During 1970 the corporation has
$100,000 of taxable income, but desires to distribute $125,000. Dividend
treatment may be avoided by repayment of a $25,000 debt.-
Distributions in Kind. Issuance of debt securities is also useful as a means
of overcoming the disadvantages of distributions of property other than money
by a subchapter S corporation. Unlike the treatment of a distribution by an
ordinary corporation,8 a distribution in kind by a subchapter S corporation
can, under certain circumstances, result in greater dividend income to the
shareholder than would be the case had the distribution been in cash. Because
of the rule that distributions of property do not reduce the amount of UTI
taxable to the shareholders," this result can occur when the corporation has
either accumulated earnings and profits8 or current earnings and profits in
excess of taxable income." For example, assume that A is the sole shareholder
of a subchapter S corporation having $5,000 of accumulated earnings and
profits, and $5,000 of current earnings and taxable income. The corporation
makes a distribution to A of property having a fair market value of $5,000.'
A three-tier system of determining the extent to which the distribution is out
of current earnings must be followed:
(1) Earnings and profits of the taxable year are first allocated to certain
actual distributions of money ....
(2) The excess of such earnings and profits over such actual distributions
of money is allocated ratably to the constructive distribution of undistributed
taxable income and actual distributions of property other than money (taken
into account at fair market value for purposes of this allocation) which are
not in exchange for stock, and
(3) The remainder of such earnings and profits is available to be allocated
to distributions in exchange for stock of the corporation such as distributions
under section 302 or 331.81
'
4A subchapter S corporation could have accumulated earnings and profits which it had
earned in prior years, or which it had already accumulated at the time of the corporation's
initial election to be taxed under the provisions of subchapter S. See notes 27 supra and 88
infra, and accompanying text.
"See Treas. Reg. § 1,1373-1(g) (1968). See generally Moore & Sorlien, Adventures
in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAx L. REV. 453 (1959).
88 In an ordinary corporation, the amount of a distribution to be treated as a dividend
to the shareholder is not dependent upon whether the distribution is of money or in kind.
If the distribution is of property other than money, it is valued at its fair market value,
which amount is dividend income to the shareholder. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 301.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(e) (1959).
"Accumulated earnings and profits could exist in a subchapter S corporation only if
it already had such accumulations at the time of its election or if they were the result of
prior years in which current earnings and profits exceeded taxable income.
8"See notes 80-81 supra, and accompanying text.
' As with the ordinary corporation, distributions of property by a subchapter S cor-
poration are valued at the current fair market value of the property. Treas. Reg.
1.1372-1(c) (2) (1959).
91d. 5 1.1373-1(e). The allocation referred to in this section of the Regulations can
be stated as follows: allocate to the property that portion of the current earnings which
bears the same ratio to the total current earnings as the market value of the property bears
to the sum of the market value of the property and the undistributed taxable income. Allo-
cate the remainder to UTI.
[Vol. 27
COMMENTS
In the example, therefore, the current earnings and profits would be allocated
equally to the distribution of property and to the constructive distribution of
UTI-$2,500 to each. However, since there are sufficient accumulated earn-
ings and profits to cover the value of the property, its entire $5,000 market
value constitutes taxable income to A. Moreover, he must include in his gross
income the amount of UTI which would have been a dividend if distributed
in cash on the last day of the taxable year.9" Since UTI is not reduced by a
distribution of property, it is still $5,000. Thus, A must report $10,000 of
ordinary income, although had the distribution been in cash, he would have
been required to report only $5,000 of income.93
The other situation in which a distribution in kind can result in increased
income to the shareholder occurs when the corporation's current earnings and
profits are greater than its taxable income. Assume that the subchapter S
corporation has current earnings and profits of $10,000, but taxable income
of only $5,000, and makes a distribution of property worth $5,000. As before,
the current earnings and profits are allocated $5,000 to the property and
$5,000 to the constructive distribution of UTI. Thus, all of the UTI and the
full value of the property are treated as dividends to the shareholder, a total
of $10,000. Had the distribution been in cash, the UTI would have been
reduced thereby, and the shareholders would have had income of only $5,000."4
In spite of these disadvantages of a distribution in kind, there could easily
be circumstances under which the shareholders of a subchapter S corporation
would nevertheless wish to make withdrawals from the corporation in the
form of property rather than cash. The procedure in such a situation would
be to have the shareholders purchase the property, exchanging it for debt
securities previously issued to them, whether in anticipation of such a trans-
action or not. The corporation may realize capital gain on such an exchange,"
which would in turn be passed through to the shareholders as capital gain. "
However, capital gain treatment would generally be preferable to the ordi-
nary income treatment of a distribution in kind.
Business and Estate Planning. Under ordinary corporate situations, two classes
"See id. S 1.1373-1(d). See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §S 301(c), 316.
93 Had there been no accumulated earnings and profits, the distribution in kind would
have resulted in only $5,000 of ordinary income to the shareholder. Current earnings and
profits would be allocated $2,500 to the property and $2,500 to UTI, leaving a total of
only $5,000 ordinary income to the shareholders. The excess of the fair market value of
the property over the amount treated as a dividend would, to the extent that it exceeded
the basis of the property, first reduce the basis of the shareholder's stock, and then be treated
as gain from the sale or exchange of property. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
301(c) (3) (A).
As in the previous situation, the shareholder's ordinary income would not have varied
with the form of the distribution had the taxable income not been less than current earnings
and profits. If both had been $10,000, the cash distribution of $5,000 would have left
$5,000 in UTI, yielding a total of $10,000 of dividend income. With a distribution in kind,
the current earnings would be allocated $6,667 to UTI and $3,333 to the property, again
resulting in $10,000 of dividend income to the shareholder.
"There is some question of whether or not the provisions of § 1239 would apply
were the corporation to distribute property which is subject to an allowance for depreciation.
If the section were applicable, ordinary income could be generated to the corporation. See
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1239.
6 See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra, for a discussion of the tax treatment of
capital gains under subchapter S.
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of stock are often used to allow greater flexibility in planning for control
and ownership of the business. This is particularly the case in close corpora-
tions, the type to which the provisions of subchapter S are generally the most
attractive. For example, assume that X, Y, and Z form a subchapter S cor-
poration, X contributing $10,000 of capital and services performed, Y con-
tributing $20,000 of capital and services performed, and Z contributing
$1,000 of capital and services performed. If each shareholder desires to elect
one of the three directors, a dilemma arises. There cannot be two classes of
stock, one voting and one nonvoting. To do so would clearly violate the one
class of stock requirement, and thus invalidate the subchapter S election.9
If only one class of stock is used, X receiving ten shares, Y receiving twenty
shares, and Z receiving one share, the goal will certainly not be reached. Nor
is issuing equal numbers of shares of a single class of stock satisfactory, for
to do so would not adequately provide for such problems as liquidation
preferences. One logical solution would be to issue ten shares to each in ex-
change for an equity investment of $1,000, and have X and Y be the holders
of $9,000 and $19,000, respectively, of corporate debt obligations. However,
according to the position taken by the Service, this would endanger the sub-
chapter S election under the one class of stock requirement.
In another situation, an employer may want to incorporate his business,
and permit certain key employees to subscribe to the common stock thereto,
while himself subscribing to a large block of a prior preference security.
Similarly, in estate planning, the controlling shareholder might prefer a fixed
income, nonvoting security for his wife, while giving common stock to chil-
dren actively engaged in the operation of the business. Because the provisions
of subchapter S preclude the possibility of using a class of preferred stock to
accomplish these legitimate business and estate planning desires, only cor-
porate indebtedness can be used. However, under the interpretation applied
by the Service, debt can only be used in those relatively rare situations in
which the shareholders can invest in debt obligations in substantially the
same proportion to their stock holdings."8
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQUIREMENT
The threat of reclassification of debt as a second class of stock in subchapter
S corporations became apparent soon after the provision became effective.
The original regulations promulgated under subchapter S made clear the
Commissioner's intention to apply the traditional debt reclassification doctrine
to subchapter S corporations for purposes of creating a second class of stock.
The original regulation stated that "[iif the outstanding shares of stock of
the corporation are not identical with respect to the rights and interests which
they convey in the control, profits, and assets of the corporation, then the
corporation is considered to have more than one class of stock. . . . If an
"See Treas. Reg. 5 1.1371-1(g) (1966). The regulations provide that "a difference
as to voting rights . . . of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation."
" See note 123 infra, and accompanying text.
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instrument purporting to be debt is actually stock, it will constitute a second
class of stock."9
The first challenge of shareholder loans under these regulations reached
the courts in 1964. In Catalina Homes, Inc."' the Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner's reclassification of a subchapter S corporation's debt as a second
class of stock where the loans carried no maturity date, were not evidenced
by any notes, were made immediately after incorporation to supplement a
patently inadequate equity contribution, and payment of interest was strictly
in the discretion of the obligor corporation."' Having reclassified the loans as
equity capital, the court considered the question of whether they constituted
a second class of stock for subchapter S purposes. Although the outcome of
the issue was consistent with the regulations, the court did not base its deci-
sion on the regulations alone.' Rather, it looked to the facts that the interest
was payable at the corporation's discretion and that no dividends could be
declared on the common stock until the loans and interest had been paid in
full. These preferences over the common stock were held to constitute a
sufficient distinction to give rise to a second class of stock."
In Henderson v. United States"'4 a district court also upheld the Commis-
sioner's decision that shareholder loans were actually equity capital and con-
stituted a second class of stock. Although conceding that mere "thinness"
alone was not sufficient to justify reclassification,"' the court emphasized the
corporation's debt/equity ratio,"6 the absence of any intent to honor the over-
due obligations, and the fact that the funds from the loans were used to pur-
chase equipment essential to the operation of the business."7 The court's
opinion made no mention of any tax avoidance motive, nor any reference to
the regulations.' 0
Catalina and Henderson both illustrate the potentially disastrous conse-
quences of debt reclassification for purposes of voiding an election under
subchapter S. In the ordinary corporation, reclassification results only in the
loss of whatever tax advantages were being sought by the use of debt rather
than equity. When a subchapter S corporation is involved, however, reclassi-
fication will also result in the imposition of the usual corporate tax, and the
loss of any previously taxed income retained by the corporation. In addition,
the accumulated earnings tax may be imposed."'
""Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 317.
'"23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
101 Id. at 1365-66. It is noteworthy that these loans were in direct proportion to the
shareholders' stockholdings.
102 In fact, the court did not even reach the question of whether or not the Regulation
was valid.
''23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367.
'°"245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
"''Id. at 785.
'6The corporation had paid-in capital of $3,000 and pro rata shareholder loans of
$58,000.
"17 245 F. Supp. at 786.
"'"See also Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v. Kennedy, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,608 (D. Wyo.
1966), where shareholder notes were held to be genuine and as such neither equity nor a
second class of stock.
'"'See INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 531-37. The accumulated earnings tax, imposed on
unreasonable accumulations of earnings and profits in the corporation, is one from which the
subchapter S corporation is exempt so long as it has a valid election in force.
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As a result of these severe consequences, and the strict, arbitrary nature of
the regulation's automatic second class rule,"' the Tax Court rejected the
regulation in W. C. Gamman.,' The majority held that the regulation was
beyond the Commissioner's authority to prescribe rules and regulations pur-
suant to the Internal Revenue Code."1 ' The Commissioner had disallowed
I" Another example of the strict interpretation by the Commissioner of the one class
of stock requirement is the position taken on voting trusts or similar shareholder agreements.
The Internal Revenue Service has held not only that irrevocable proxies granted by one
shareholder to another gave rise to a second class of stock, but also:
[1]n the event that the outstanding stock of a corporation is subject to any
other type of voting control device or arrangement, such as a pooling or voting
agreement or a charter provision granting certain shares a veto power or the
like, which has the effect of modifying the voting rights of part of the stock
so that particular shares possess disproportionate voting power as compared
to the dividend rights or liquidation rights of those shares and as compared
to the voting, dividend and liquidation rights of the other shares of stock of
the corporation outstanding, the corporation will be deemed to have more
than one class of stock.
Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 341, 342. The relationship this ruling bears to
the purposes behind the one class of stock requirement is difficult to see, if indeed there
be any. See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.
1146 T.C. 1 (1966), appeal dismissed per stipulation, Citator CCH 1973 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. 90,839.
"'The authority to be given regulations promulgated by the Commissioner pursuant
to the Internal Revenue Code is the central issue in much tax litigation. Such has par-
ticularly been true in cases arising out of the one class of stock requirement of subchapter S.
The doctrine was early established that substantial weight is to be given to any inter-
pretation of a statute by the administrative officials whose duty it is to effectuate its execu-
tion. Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 7 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 126 (1827). Under the specific pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Commissioner is expressly delegated the
authority to prescribe all necessary rules and regulations for the enforcement of the tax laws.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 7805. The United States Supreme Court early upheld the con-
stitutionality of a similar congressional delegation of authority. Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). To the extent such regulations are consistent with the statute
and are not arbitrary, they will be applied with particular weight and upheld by the courts
in litigation arising from such application. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496 (1948). In fact, they have been held to have the force of law. Maryland Cas.
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920). However, the power to prescribe rules and
regulations is not the power to make law, but only the power to effectuate the will of Con-
gress, as expressed by the statute. Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
A regulation may not expand or change the meaning of a revenue law, Commissioner v.
Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957); Koshland
v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936); alter nor amend the law, Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S.
466 (1883); extend a statute or modify its provisions, Campbell v. Galeno Chem. Co., 281
U.S. 599 (1930); take away any rights and privileges which the Congress has given,
Russel Mfg. Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. Cl. 1959); nor can it impose or
add conditions which Congress did not impose, unless such conditions are necessary to make
effective the conditions Congress did impose, Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. United States, 117
F. Supp. 424 (Ct. Cl. 1954). Where a regulation constitutes an amendment or modification
of the statute as enacted by Congress, it is beyond the power of the Commissioner, and, as
such, invalid. The courts must refrain from giving effect to such a regulation. Louisville Gas
& Elec. Co. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 671 (1960). The test to be applied to a regulation
is, thus, two-pronged. The first determination to be made is whether it is consistent with the
statute: "[The Supreme] Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be
sustained unless . . . plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute
contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons." Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber
Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). Assuming that the regulation is consistent with the revenue
statute, it must also meet a reasonableness test:
The power of administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute
and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make
law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power to
adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by
the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a rule
out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity . . . . And not only must
COMMENTS
deductions claimed by the shareholders for operating losses incurred by the
corporation on the ground that debt advances made by them were in reality
equity, and thus, under the existing regulations, a second class of stock.
Looking to the "economic substance" of the advances, the court concluded
that the purported debt capital was in reality equity capital. The significant
consideration was stated to be "whether the funds were advanced with reason-
able expectations of repayment regardless of the success of the venture or
were placed at the risk of the business." '113 The court also emphasized the
abnormally high debt/equity ratio of the corporation's capital structure,"4
and the fact that a disinterested outside investor would never have loaned the
corporation money on the same terms as had the shareholders.11
Although it held that the advances were equity, the court nonetheless
refused to follow the applicable regulation, ' holding that the advances were
not a second class of stock for purposes of the validity of the corporation's
subchapter S election. The offensive element of the regulation was the absolute
rule that anytime a purported debt was in reality equity it would constitute a
second class of stock. The court stated that the question should rather be one
of "fact in each case whether advances by stockholders in the form of loans,
which in economic substance are equity capital, constitute a second class of
stock....""" This determination must be made in light of Congress' purpose
in imposing the one class of stock requirement"' and the clear intent of
Congress that shareholder loans be permissible, as evidenced by the provisions
of section 1376,"' which provide special rules for adjusting the basis of share-
holder held indebtedness. The proper test was stated to be "whether the
instruments, even though they represent equity capital, actually gave the
a regulation, in order to be valid, be consistent with the statute, but must be
reasonable.
Manhattan Gen. Equip. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Given these two
aspects of the test, it is altogether possible that a regulation, although in complete harmony
with the letter of the statute, would be adjudged unreasonable, and, thus, declared invalid.
Although the dicta of the cases seems to indicate that presumptive weight is to be given the
regulations, Colgate Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422 (1943); Fawcus Mach. Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931), the reality is that the courts generally make an inde-
pendent consideration of the merits, and uphold the regulations if in harmony with their
interpretation of the statute, Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948);
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), but overrule the regula-
tions if out of harmony with their own interpretation. Coady v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.
771 (1960), aft'd, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87
(1959); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957). See also Lane, Attacking the
Regulations, 52 A.B.A.J. 187 (1966).
Assuming that a convincing argument could be made that the thin incorporation principle
of debt reclassification, as applied to a normal corporation, should not be applied to a sub-
chapter S corporation for purposes of giving rise to a second class of stock, thus invalidating
an otherwise proper election, it would not seem to be too difficult to show that regulations
to the contrary are unreasonable, even though consistent with the letter of the statute.
146 T.C. at 10. See also Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
...46 T.C. at 10. The debt/equity ratio of the corporation was over 2,145:1.
115 Id.
".Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 317. The holdings in
Catalina and Henderson were held to be inapplicable to Gamman, since neither of those
decisions reached the question of the validity of the regulation.
"' 46 T.C. at 11.
I's Id.
"" INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1376.
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holders thereof any rights and interests in the corporation different from
those enjoyed by the holders of the nominal stock."'20
The court also expressed its feeling that debt reclassification under the
thin incorporation doctrine should not be used to give rise to a second class
of stock for subchapter S purposes, stating that since "[t]he underlying pur-
poses of Subchapter S appears to be to avoid [the] double tax on corporate
earnings . . . [there is] little in the way of unintended tax advantages that
might be gained by having the stockholders advance funds in the form of
loans rather than capital where, as here, the corporation has no accumulated
earnings and profits."''
The Tax Court again refused to follow the regulations in Lewis Building
& Supplies, Inc." As in Gamman, the court found the corporation to be
thinly capitalized where $1,000 of the capital represented equity while $18,500
was debt. The court refused to agree with the Commissioner's determination
that the advances constituted a second class of stock. Rather, it found that
the shareholder received no greater or different rights by reason of the
advances. The significant distinction between Gamman and Lewis is that in
the latter case the advances were not in the same proportion as the share-
holders' stock ownership.
Shortly after the Gamman and Lewis decisions, the Commissioner revised
the regulation. Applying the strictest possible interpretation of the court's
opinion in Gamman, the new regulation read, in part:
Obligations which purport to represent debt but which actually represent
equity capital will generally constitute a second class of stock. However, if
such purported debt obligations are owned solely by the owners of nominal
stock of the corporation in substantially the same proportion as they own
such nominal stock, such purported debt obligations will be treated as con-
tributions to capital rather than as a second class of stock."
Evidently ignoring the Lewis decision, the new regulation established a rule
under which proportionality of the debt held by shareholders to their equity
is determinative.
The first case directly dealing with the validity of the new regulation was
Brennan v. O'Donnell., The corporation involved was capitalized with
extensive use of shareholder loans, contributed in substantially, although not
exactly, the same proportion as the shareholders' respective stock holdings in
the corporation." The court held that the new regulation was invalid, stating
that "to the extent the regulations insist that disproportionately held debt-
22046 T.C. at 9.
Id. at 12.
'225 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 844 (1966).
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1966). The new regulations further provide that if the
proportionality is altered by any circumstance, "a new determination shall be made as to
whether the corporation has more than one class of stock as of the time of such change."Id.
124 322 F. Supp. 1069 (N.D. Ala. 1971). Although a number of cases were decided
under the new regulation prior to Brennan, none dealt specifically with the question of the
validity of the regulation. See, e.g., August F. Nielson, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 44 (1968);
Milton T. Raynor, 50 T.C. 762 (1968). It is noteworthy that in none of these cases did
the courts hold for the Government.1 322 F. Supp. at 1073.
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equity disqualify a corporation from Subchapter S treatment, they have over-
reached the statute and are invalid.""1 ' The court apparently relied heavily on
the fact that the characterization of the contributions as debt did not appear
to be motivated by any tax avoidance motive. Moreover, the court pointed
out that to require that a corporation in need of additional funds recapitalize
rather than merely allow the shareholders to make a contribution in the form
of debt is hardly consonant with the purposes of simplification and adminis-
trative ease behind the imposition of the one class of stock requirement for
subchapter S corporations.1"
In James L. Stinnett, Jr.128 the Tax Court agreed with the federal district
court in Brennan and held that the new regulation was invalid. Assuming the
truth of the Commissioner's contention that the debt should be regarded as
equity, it did not necessarily follow that there existed two classes of stock.
Although the debt was held disproportionately by the shareholders, the notes
evidencing the debt did not entitle the holders thereof to any right to vote,
participate in the management of the business, or share in the earnings and
growth of the business. In other words, the notes carried with them none of
the incidents of ownership commonly attributable to stock. Expressly refusing
to apply the regulations, the court held that a debt instrument "does not give
rise to more than one class of stock . . . merely because the debt creates
disproportionate rights among the stockholders .. 2. "" To be considered as
a second class of stock, the instrument must bear at least some of the general
characteristics of stock.'
Such was the case under the facts of Portage Plastics Co. v. United States."'2
The corporation issued certain instruments to two nonshareholders in con-
sideration for advances of $12,500 each. The notes were payable after five
years, renewable for five additional years. The interest on the advances was
stated to be five percent of the corporation's net profits before taxes. Over a
five-year period, $16,180 was paid in interest alone on each of the $12,500
notes. The notes contained no provision for repayment, nor was there any
collateral given. These factors, together with the high debt/equity ratio, led
both the district court and the circuit court of appeals to the conclusion that
the notes constituted contributions to equity capital. As the opinions of both
courts stated, the determinative factor was whether one making the advance
126 Id. at 1072. The court also made reference to the recently enacted provision of the
Code which delegated to the Commissioner the authority "to prescribe such regulations
as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to
be treated . . . as stock or indebtedness." INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 385 (a). Such dele-
gation did not give any additional weight to the Commissioner's debt/equity regulations
under § 1371, at least not in the eyes of the Brennan court. In fact, Judge Pointer, writing
the opinion for the court, seemed to anticipate that the delegation under § 385 was subject
to attack as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. 322 F. Supp. at 1073 n.7.
See also Bravenec, What Are the "Hidden Effects" of Recent Legislation upon Subchapter
S Eligibility?, 38 J. TAXATION 152 (1973).
" 322 F. Supp. at 1073.
12' 54 T.C. 221 (1970).
Id. at 232.
10 The court's opinion did not discuss what characteristics of stock are necessary for re-
classified debt to give rise to a second class of stock.
131 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. Tax Cas. (73-1, at 80,511) 5 9261 (7th
Cit. 1973), rev'g 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,325 (7th Cit. 1972).
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intends "to make an investment and take the risks of the venture ... [or]
seeks a definite obligation, payable in any event."""
The district court and a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit failed to
agree, however, on the question of whether the debt capital, having been
reclassified as equity, necessarily gave rise to a second class of stock. Based
upon what it considered to be the purposes of subchapter S, and, in particular,
the one class of stock requirement,"'s the district court held that the "tradi-
tional debt/equity tests applied in other areas of tax litigation are [not]
relevant to the general purposes of Subchapter S.*"4 The three-judge panel,
however, reversed, writing the only opinion to date in which the regulation
has been upheld."' Having concluded that the advances were in reality equity,
the court held that they must necessarily give rise to a second class of stock,
the majority being "of the opinion that there is no such thing as 'non-stock
equity.' W36
Upon rehearing en banc, however, the court of appeals unanimously
reversed the decision of the panel, and held for the taxpayer."3 ' The court
declared the regulation invalid upon reasoning much like that used in the
Brennan and Stinnett opinions."'
72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,325, 85,328 (7th Cir. 1972), quoting Commissioner v. Me-
ridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1942). The purported debt
in this case was held not to meet the classic criteria of a bona fide debt. The court stated
that the "classic debt is an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably close
fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable regardless of the
debtor's income or lack thereof." Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cit. 1957).
133 301 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
'The purposes identified by the court were (1) to permit small business to select
the form of their organization without the necessity of taking into account major tax differ-
ences; (2) to avoid the administrative complexities which would arise from the allocation
of earnings or losses among several classes of stock, and in particular in allocation when
there is a payment of dividends on preferred stock in excess of earnings; (3) to allow small
corporations, essentially comparable to partnerships and proprietorships to be taxed as such.
id. at 694.
3 id,
' 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,327. Accepting the validity of the regulation, the court
expressly took issue with the holding in prior cases:
[T]he question of whether a purported debt instrument is actually representa-
tive of an equity interest is a question quite relevant to corporations which
have elected to be taxed under Subchapter S. Secondly . . . and herein lies
the crucial difference between our holding and that of others in the area, we
are of the opinion that the criteria heretofore developed to determine the ques-




3 7 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. Tax Cas. (73-1, at 80,511) 5 9261 (7th
Cir. 1973).
11Id. at 80,516. Although the en banc decision brings the Seventh Circuit into line
with the Fifth Circuit and the Tax Court on the one class of stock issue, the Government
may reasonably be expected to file an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. An opinion by the Supreme Court reversing or affirming the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision could clarify the debt reclassification problem under subchapter S. However,
it is altogether possible that a decision based upon the unique fact situation in Portage
Plastics could set a precedent which, when applied to facts more typically arising under
subchapter S, would give rise to an unintended result. The "debt" instruments involved in
Portage Plastics were much more nearly characteristic of a class of preferred stock than has
been the case in those instruments involved in other debt reclassification decisions. If the
Supreme Court reverses, holding that reclassifying debt as equity gives rise to a second
class of stock, rather than reversing, if at all, strictly on the facts involved, the issue will
be resolved on a very unrepresentative fact situation. Such a decision would only serve to
further complicate an already confused question.
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Still another court declared the regulation invalid as being arbitrary and
beyond the scope of the Commissioner's power.' The court stated that there
is no purpose in limiting debt obligations to those made pro rata by the
shareholders, particularly if the use of the debt in question serves a purpose
within the contemplation of subchapter S. Applying the debt reclassification
test, the purported debt was held to be equity. The court refused, however,
to consider the equity as a second class of stock for purposes of the sub-
chapter S election. Reclassified debt is to be treated as non-stock equity.40
Shores Realty Co. v. United States,14" ' decided the same day, reached the
same result by also declaring the regulation invalid. The view taken by the
Shores court, however, was that the debt reclassification test is altogether
inapplicable to a subchapter S corporation. In view of the purposes and re-
quirements of subchapter S, there is never any need for application of the
test. The tax avoidance possibilities of thin capitalization are not present in
a subchapter S corporation, and the shareholders should thus be left to
capitalize their corporation as they see fit.
III. THE PURPOSES OF DEBT RECLASSIFICATION IN THE SUBCHAPTER
S CORPORATION
In each of the decisions arising out of the one class of stock requirement,
discussed above, the purported debt was reclassified as equity. These reclassi-
fications were arrived at through the application of the traditional doctrine of
debt reclassification." The development of this doctrine evolved, however,
from a long line of cases"s involving ordinary corporations and the tax
problems unique to them. The failure of the Commissioner to analyze the
distinctions between such corporations and those organized within the require-
ments of subchapter S has generated the considerable confusion now sur-
rounding the one class of stock requirement. Although there are purposes for
which debt reclassification is legitimate in the case of a subchapter S corpora-
tion, they are limited. The prevention of tax avoidance is, of course, always
a valid goal for the Commissioner. If the use of debt rather than equity is
solely for the purpose of gaining impermissible tax advantages, it should be
reclassified in the subchapter S and ordinary corporate situations alike. The
doctrine should also be applied to insure compliance with the congressional
policy underlying the one class of stock requirement.
A. Prevention of Tax Avoidance
The underlying purpose behind the development of the doctrine of debt
reclassification was the prevention of the avoidance of the double tax imposed
on corporate income."M Reclassification was allowed only when, under the
139Amory Cotton Oil Co. v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,775 (5th Cir. 1972).
14See Bravenec, supra note 3, at 231.
141468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972). The Shores opinion pointed out that the statute
spoke only in terms of "stock," although the regulations referred to "capital." It was in this
respect that the regulations went beyond the scope of the statute, and thus rendered them
invalid.
142 See notes 64-70 supra, and accompanying text.
143 See M. LORE, supra note 2, at 33.
14 See note 63 supra, and accompanying text.
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totality of the circumstances, it was clear that the only purpose in labeling
the advance as debt, rather than equity, was to conceal the true substance of
a contribution to the risk capital of the business. Thus, some element of tax
avoidance has always been considered a prerequisite to debt reclassification."
The most common avoidance purpose, the double tax on corporate income,
is not present in subchapter S situations, of course, since exemption from all
tax at the corporate level is the very essence of subchapter S. 46 Assuming
that there are no specific tax avoidance motives, the desire to obtain the tax
advantages available under subchapter S is not an impermissible tax avoid-
ance, even if there is no other business purpose for the election than tax
minimization.47
Given the prerequisite of a finding of a tax avoidance motive before debt
reclassification, the doctrine should not be automatically applied any time
there is a showing of thin capitalization. An inquiry should first be made into
whether a tax benefit did in fact accrue, and whether the debt was intended
to achieve such a result. If the purpose for the use of the debt was to ac-
complish impermissible tax avoidance,' 4' reclassification is legitimate. Absent
such a purpose, however, the shareholders should be allowed to finance their
corporation as they see fit. Assuming debt has been improperly used in an
attempt to achieve impermissible tax avoidance, and such debt has been
reclassified as equity, does it necessarily follow that the reclassified equity
must be considered a second class of stock? All the courts which have con-
sidered the issue have held that it should not. The only advantages the parties
could have been seeking through the use of debt rather than equity are those
which arise from its unique character: deductibility of interest to the corpora-
tion; non-income status or repayment to the debtholder; protection from the
accumulated earnings tax. Once the debt has been reclassified as equity, that
unique character is lost. Going a step further and treating the equity as a
second class of stock can do no more to prevent tax avoidance. Its only effect
is disqualification of the corporation for election under subchapter S, a result
wholly unrelated to the question of tax avoidance and equally unrelated to its
prevention.
"'See generally M. LORE, supra note 2; Caplin, supra note 2; Schlesinger, 'Thin" In-
corporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1947); Note,
supra note 65.
4' Three of the major tax avoidance motives present in an ordinary corporation do not
apply at all to a subchapter S corporation: (1) classifying distributions as interest rather
than dividends; (2) deduction of payments as cost of goods sold rather than dividends;
(3) classifying advances as loans for purposes of the bad debt deduction.
' Wilhelm v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 16, 19-20 (D. Wyo. 1966).
148 See, e.g., note 77 supra, and accompanying text. The question of the burden of proof
becomes pertinent at this point. The court in Catalina took the position that the burden
was on the taxpayer to show that there was no tax avoidance motive in the use of debt. 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367. This places on the taxpayer the burden of disproving every
conceivable tax avoidance motive, even though the Commissioner either cannot or does not
identify a single tax benefit arising from the use of the debt rather than equity. Such a
position is unprecedented and unjustifiable. There is no basis for assuming that under sub-
chapter S advances which are in reality equity, but treated as debt, will automatically gen-
erate favorable tax consequences. If tax avoidance is recognized as an essential prerequisite
of debt reclassification, the burden of proof should be on the Commissioner to show that




B. Compliance with the Single Class of Stock Requirement
A second conceivable purpose for debt reclassification is to insure that the
intent of Congress in imposing the one class of stock requirement is carried
out. It is arguable that a corporation which in reality does not meet the
qualifications for election under subchapter S should not be allowed to cir-
cumvent congressional intent by juggling the names of its securities. When
used to prevent this end, the goal of debt reclassification is different from
when preventing tax avoidance. The tests to be applied must likewise be
different. The criterion should be that if the use of debt rather than equity
in some way contravenes the purpose behind the one class of stock require-
ment, the debt will be reclassified not only as equity, but as a second class of
stock as well. The problem thus centers around a determination of the con-
gressional purpose. As previously discussed,149 Congress' purpose seems to
have been twofold. The difficulty anticipated by the 1954 Senate Report'50
was that the distribution of preferred stock dividends in excess of current
earnings and profits would make it possible for the preferred shareholders to
receive income previously taxed to the common shareholders as UTI. The
income would thus be taxed twice unless a deduction were allowed to the
common shareholders, which would be extremely difficult where the common
stock had been transferred in the interim.
These fears are largely groundless. There is no basis for an assumption that
the dividends paid on a second class of stock would necessarily come from
the common shareholders' PTI accounts. The amount of cash on hand avail-
able for distribution from PTI might be reduced, but the balance shown in
the account itself would remain unchanged. Even assuming that the PTI
balances would be reduced, it does not necessarily follow that the common
shareholders must be allowed a deduction. The Code provides for a number
of other ways in which tax free withdrawal from the PTI account can be
forfeited,"' none of which are compensated for by deduction. A partial transfer
of a shareholder's common stock does not affect the PTI account, and a com-
plete transfer destroys it altogether. Finally, if the PTI account were reduced
and a corresponding deduction allowed the shareholder, no problem would
arise. Moreover, these difficulties, if present, would not furnish support for
debt reclassification, for if a problem exists at all, it exists regardless of
whether the debt is bona fide or concealed equity.
Another problem anticipated by the Senate was the potential complexity
involved in passing corporate earnings through to a widely diversified group
of shareholders.' When there is but a single class of stock, the computation
of each shareholder's individual income is very simple. When, however, there
are multiple classes of stock, with varying rights and representing varying
contributions to risk capital, it would be impossible for the Commissioner to
allocate accurately the percentage of income and losses attributable to each
share. However, use of shareholder debt, to whatever degree, creates no such
"'See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
15 0 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 453-54 (1954).
' See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
152S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1964).
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problems. Assuming the debt to be in reality concealed equity, and subject
to reclassification in a normal corporation to prevent tax avoidance, it in no
way follows that it need be deemed as constituting a second class of stock.
There will be no complexities of allocation or administration if the Com-
missioner merely ignores the debt in allocating income and losses among
the shareholders.
Alternatively, the income and losses could be allocated solely according to
the amounts contributed to capital, including reclassified debt. Since other
rights and interest, such as voting rights and liquidation or dividend prefer-
ences, need not be taken into account, the Commissioner would encounter no
administrative complexities. In fact, it would seem to be much less of a burden
than many other allocations the Commissioner is called upon to make."'
IV. CONCLUSION
The only legitimate purpose of debt reclassification under subchapter S is
the prevention of impermissible tax avoidance schemes. If corporate debt is
used to accomplish such impermissible ends, it should unquestionably be
reclassified as equity. Being considered as equity for these purposes, however,
does not necessarily require that the purported debt be considered as equity
for all purposes. There is no logical basis for requiring that all equity auto-
matically be stock equity. Furthermore, the legitimate purposes of reclassifi-
cation can be completely satisfied without considering the reclassified debt as
a second class of stock. Treating the equity as stock equity will go no further
in preventing tax avoidance nor avoid any complexities of administration or
allocation whatsoever. The only conceivable result in deeming reclassified
equity in subchapter S corporations as giving rise to a second class of stock,
would be to thwart the clear intent of Congress"5 4 by arbitrarily and unneces-
sarily denying the benefits of subchapter S to a corporation otherwise entitled
to their enjoyment.
153 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 1 375(c). Under the provisions of that section,
the Commissioner may apportion corporate earnings among shareholders who are also
members of the same family "in order to reflect the value of services rendered to the cor-
poration by such shareholders." Id.
154 The logical solution to this as well as other problems under subchapter S is seen
by many to be in congressional reform. See generally, Pennell, Subchapter S-The Need
for Legislation, 24 TAx LAWYER 249 (1971). The confusion among the bar, the Service,
the courts, and the electing corporations themselves could best be cleared by an authorita-
tive word from Congress that the purposes of subchapter S are not such as to be compatible
with the application of the doctrine of debt reclassification to give rise to a disqualifying
second class of stock. If the one class of stock requirement is merely a rule of administrative
convenience, Congress should expressly provide that the shareholders' designation of an
advance as debt or equity is determinative for purposes of classes of stock.
An excellent source of legislative proposals to meet the problems in subchapter S can
be found in a series of papers published in 3 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE (TAx REVISION COMPENDI-
UM), H.R. Doc. No. 47060, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1711-48 (1959). Although these papers
were submitted in 1959, only a year after subchapter S was enacted, it was already becoming
clear that the provision was in need of reform in certain respects. These papers contain many
worthy proposals for dealing with the one class of stock requirement and its ramifications.
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